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Socioeconomics of Individual
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In many fisheries around the world, the failures of centralized, top-down management have produced
a shift toward co-management—collaboration and sharing of decision making between government and
stakeholders. This trend has led to a major debate between two very different co-management
approaches—community-based fishery management and market-based individual transferable quota
management. This paper examines the debate over the relative merits of these models and undertakes
a socioeconomic analysis of the two approaches. The paper includes (1) an analysis of differences in the
structure, philosophical nature, and underlying value systems of each, including a discussion of their
treatment of property rights; (2) a socioeconomic evaluation of the impacts of each system on boat
owners, fishers, crew members, other fishery participants, and coastal communities, as well as the distri-
bution of benefits and costs among fishery participants; and (3) examination of indirect economic effects
that can occur through impacts on conservation and fishery sustainability. The latter relate to (a) the
conservation ethic, (b) the flexibility of management, (c) the avoidance of waste, and (d) the efficiency
of enforcement. The paper emphasizes the need for a broader approach to analyzing fishery management
options, one that recognizes and properly assesses the diversity of choices, and that takes into account
the interaction of the fishery with broader community and regional realities.
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Centralized, top-down approaches to fishery man-
agement—the sort found in many management
agencies within developed countries—have been
discredited in the wake of harvest declines and fish-
ery collapses around the world, notably that of the
Atlantic Canadian groundfishery (Charles, 1997). It
has become clear that, while the government must
maintain its overall role in guiding the fishery to
best meet the needs of fishers, coastal communities,
and citizens as a whole, fishery management must
evolve toward co-management—closer collabora-
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tion and a greater sharing of responsibilities and de-
cision making between government and stakeholders.
While the above reality seems generally accepted,
this is where the agreement ends. There are two
main contrasting visions of co-management. On the
one hand, there are those who view the fishery as a
cornerstone of the coastal economy, and of coastal
life in general, and see co-management as a tool for
careful planning to meet the current and future needs
of both fishers and the communities in which they
live. These people will tend to opt for a planned
approach to co-management, likely through what is
called community-based management. Others, who
seek market-based approaches to management, tend
to consider persons who currently hold marketable
individual quotas as the legitimate stakeholders in
the fishery, in whose interest the fishery should be
managed. While the variety and complexity of
fishery conditions leaves room for many different
options in structuring fishery management, the most
important debate regarding the choice of man-
agement system seems to be associated with the
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approaches identified above: community-based
management and market-based individual trans-
ferable quota (ITQ) management. The literature
contains a variety of work relating to this debate—
see, for example, Charles (2001, 2002); Copes
(1986, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000); Neher, Arnason,
and Mollett (1989); Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1993); Pinkerton
(1989); Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995); Pomeroy
(1995); Shotton (2000); Townsend and Charles
(1997).
This paper examines the debate and undertakes
an analysis of the two management models. We
begin by briefly describing what is meant by each
of the management approaches. This is followed by
an examination of the structure, philosophical
nature, and underlying value systems of each, in-
cluding an overview of their treatment of property
rights. A socioeconomic evaluation follows, with
discussion of the distribution of benefits and costs
among fishery participants, community economic
impacts, and finally indirect economic effects that
can occur through impacts on conservation and
fishery sustainability.
Community-Based Fishery Management
Nova Scotia’s Coastal Communities Network
(CCN) defines community-based fishery co-man-
agement as “a method or system of management in
which harvester and community interests have a
significant role in the management of fishery
resources,” and where “local organizations clearly
define and share specific management responsi-
bilities and authority” with governments. The CCN
notes that “in all community based co-management
activities, fishers are recognized as the primary
participants” but at the same time, “the involvement
and support of the broader community is essential”
(CNN, 1997, online report).
How does such a system operate in practice?
First, the CCN highlights the key point that “local
community representatives will share in manage-
ment responsibilities through a community board
representing stakeholders in the local fishery and in
the coastal community at large.” Second, “the vari-
ous roles will be defined by each local community
through consultation among the representatives.”
Third, “the government will introduce the legisla-
tion necessary to delegate the requisite authority to
the community boards so that they may implement
the policies decided by them.” Within this frame-
work, community-based management would follow
a broad set of management objectives whereby
“board decisions will take into consideration the
sustainability of the industry and the community,
and will also address social, economic, and ecolog-
ical factors” (CNN, 1997, online report).
Individual Quota Management
Individual quotas represent fractions of a Total
Allowable Catch (TAC), the total weight of fish of
a defined stock (usually of a single species) that
may be caught in any given year. Typically, a TAC
is split up into various pieces, perhaps by fleet sec-
tor, by gear type, by size of vessel, or by community
(where community quotas are in place). Individual
quotas extend this sub-division down to the
individual fisher level, giving each quota holder the
right to catch a certain percentage of the TAC each
year, typically based initially on how much fish
each caught in the past (the so-called catch history,
specifically the average catch attributed to the boat
owner over a specified period of time).
The most publicized form of such quotas are
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). If a fisher
holds an ITQ equal to, say, 0.1% of the TAC for
haddock in a given area, then the fisher would
have the right to catch whatever quantity of
haddock this value amounts to, over the course
of the year. For example, if the total TAC in the
area was 10,000 tons, the right would be to catch
10 tons. Not only is the fisher allowed to transfer
quota to someone else within a given year (if, for
example, the fisher is unable to go fishing in that
year, or has more quota than is needed), permanent
transfers of quotas can occur, whereby fishers and
corporations can buy and sell quota at will, with
few restrictions.
It is also possible for individual quotas to be non-
transferable, with the difference from ITQs lying in
what happens to the individual quotas between
years. Permanent sales or transfers of quota are not
allowed, so at the start of a new year, whatever
temporary arrangements may have been made, the
percentage of the TAC held by each fisher reverts
back to what it was previously. Thus each fisher’s
share remains the same from year to year. This
system is in use in various jurisdictions (e.g., some
parts of the Nova Scotian fishery), and is similar to
the Enterprise Allocations which have been used in
the offshore fishery of Atlantic Canada since the
early 1980s. Some discussion of these nontrans-
ferable quotas is included here, but the primary
focus of this paper is on ITQs. Because ITQs areCopes and Charles ITQs and Community-Based Fishery Management   173
more heavily promoted at present, they need to be
examined with particular care.
CBM versus ITQs: A Contrast in
Value Systems
With community-based management (CBM) and
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) attracting so
much attention, it is important to understand the
key differences between them. These management
approaches reflect very different views of what
fisheries are all about. We must consider how they
compare in meeting the current as well as the future
needs of vessel owners, crew members, processing
plant workers, and their communities. What is good
and what is not, must be viewed from many angles:
conservation of the resource base, sustainability of
communities, economic viability of fishing enter-
prises, employment and income levels in the fishery,
the distribution of income, and so on. Such diversity
of considerations is needed in order to address
important issues under the three major aspects of
fisheries policy: biological, social, and economic.
First, in exploring the nature of CBM and ITQs,
it is of interest to note that in theory, both could be
used in the same fishery. This is because CBM is
more of a framework for organizing fishery manage-
ment at the local level, while ITQs represent a very
specific way of dividing up a Total Allowable
Catch (TAC). Thus, there is nothing to prevent a
community from choosing ITQs as a part of its
community-based management. The community
might manage its fishery through a TAC and other
conservation and harvesting regulations, and then
allocate ITQs to its fishers, leaving the fishers to
buy and sell quota. In practice, however, this would
be a dubious combination. Community-based man-
agement typically places a high value on community
sustainability and well-being, which requires a
planned approach to the fishery. An ITQ fishery
relies on the market to make decisions, so there is
really no place for community interests or com-
munity planning.
Thus, it comes down to a matter of philosophy:
whether there is to be a role for the community or
whether all decisions are to be made at the
individual level, through the marketplace. In this
regard, CBM and ITQs are based on different value
systems, or ideologies. This is particularly notice-
able with respect to socioeconomic aspects, the
focus of this article, where community-based and
market-based approaches to fisheries management
diverge widely.
On the one hand, a system of ITQ management
is driven directly by market forces with a goal of
maximizing the profits going to those corporations
or individuals who own the access rights to the
fishery in the form of quotas. Essentially, an ITQ
system’s operational objectives are confined to
narrow economic considerations of the market. ITQ
systems in their basic logic and design are struc-
tured to ignore or override any considerations of
equity, resource conservation, or community welfare
and sustainability, that conflict with profit maximi-
zation by quota owners.
A community-based co-management system con-
trasts with the “pure economics” in the interest of
quota owners which is characteristic of market-based
ITQ management. Instead, it is open to considera-
tion of a wide range of human needs in the com-
munity. It therefore lends itself to implementation
of a balanced mix of biological, social, and eco-
nomic objectives. Economic considerations certainly
do play an important role in community-based man-
agement, but that role is subordinate to the chosen
overall objectives of the community. In other
words, in community-based management, markets
are made to serve human needs, which contrasts
with the ITQ scheme in which fate and fortune of
humans are ruled by market forces.
Property Rights Issues
The contrast between the two systems is evident
from the decidedly different approaches they take
to property rights. Community-based management
is compatible with the innate common-property
nature of the fish stocks and the ecology that
produces and nurtures them. The need to recognize
ecosystems as indivisible units, held as collective
property, is well understood. The principles com-
patible with community-based management include
equitably distributed access rights for local fishers
to their common-property resources. Providing
fishery-dependent local populations with priority
access rights to adjacent resources, based on histor-
ical use, is an essential underpinning of community-
based management. Such local “territorial use rights
in fisheries” have been recognized for centuries,
implicitly or explicitly, by maritime cultures in
many settings throughout the world.
Property rights in ITQ fisheries are sharply differ-
ent. Proponents of ITQs claim they provide a way
to privatize the fisheries, thereby bringing superior
efficiency advantages of individual ownership.
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based on the false notion that fishers’ property
rights through quotas are equivalent to the property
rights of, for instance, a farmer, who owns and con-
trols specific animals, as well as the farm’s facilities
and resources needed to raise those animals. Equiv-
alence would require giving every fisher exclusive
rights to, and control over, a specific identified set
of fish, along with the ecosystem that produces
those fish. This might be imagined in a few cases—
such as sedentary shellfish fisheries, in which
private rights might be assigned to certain shellfish
beds on a lease or ownership basis—but it is clearly
not the way most fisheries operate. While ITQs do
privatize fisheries in the sense of turning fishery
access rights into privately owned marketable
assets, the fish itself remains a public resource, and
generally ITQs give no individual property rights at
all to any specified fish or specified part of the eco-
system that produces fish. Participants in an ITQ
fishery continue to compete for catches from a
common pool of fish, with the incentive to get the
most valuable fish before a competitor does. In the
process, ITQ fishers, pursuing their individual inter-
ests, are often induced to adopt practices which can
inflict great damage on stocks and/or the supporting
ecosystem (described below). Therefore, any claim
that ITQs are equivalent to the individual owner-
ship arrangements characteristic of other industries,
and thus offer the superior performance possible in
those arrangements, is not supported by an examin-
ation of the evidence.
Socioeconomic Comparisons
We turn now to the key question: What are the
socioeconomic implications of CBM and ITQs?
Unfortunately, the reality is that this question has
received little attention by researchers. While many
economists have been eager to examine individual
transferable quotas, most economic studies of ITQs
have focused narrowly on the harvesting process
and impacts on boat owners. This has ignored the
broader and more important issues of regional and
community impacts. For example, while studies typi-
cally show that profits accruing to quota holders are
maximized with the buying and selling of ITQs, little
attention is paid to indirect impacts of ITQs on
profits and losses throughout the economy, and to the
distribution of benefits and losses in society. Mean-
while, community-based fishery management has
received little attention in the economics literature, so
there are few studies available on the alternatives to
ITQ systems that such management could offer.
This paper represents one small attempt to rectify
this imbalance, offering a broad perspective on
the socioeconomic impacts of ITQs and CBM.
In the discussion below, we first look at impacts on
boat owners and fishers, then at impacts on the
communities and regional economy, and finally at
the long-term economic effects of conservation
impacts.
Impacts on Boat Owners and Fishers
Typically, ITQ systems have been put in place
through a process in which quotas initially are
given out free of charge to individuals who happen
to be vessel license owners at the time ITQ
management is introduced. This is a tangible and
immediate benefit to that group of license owners,
who thereby acquire quotas as assets which can be
kept indefinitely, or sold off for a windfall cash
profit, or even used as collateral for a loan. The
value of such assets is often touted as an attractive
benefit to fishers. However, if we compare this with
the same fishery managed through a non-ITQ
community-based system, with limited entry and
tradable fishing licenses, it may well be that the total
value of a fisher’s license plus quota in the ITQ
system is no greater than (and may be less than) the
license value alone in the alternative system. This
is because the total value of fishing rights, whether
in licenses and/or individual quotas, reflects a share
of the net value generated by the fishery. How large
this value is depends on the financial success of the
fishery under either system, which will vary accord-
ing to circumstances.
There are some good reasons to believe well-
designed CBM systems can offer a generally better
performance than ITQ systems in terms of lower
management costs, particularly as they may avoid
the costly and often ineffective efforts to police the
separate individual quota catches of all boats. CBM
systems may also offer superior TACs by avoiding
or minimizing stock losses caused by quota busting,
high grading, data fouling, and other adverse prac-
tices induced by ITQ management. Consequently,
community-based management may provide at least
as great a set of economic assets, through fishing
rights, as can an ITQ system. It will depend on how
well each system performs and on the financial ar-
rangements made in either case by the government
acting on behalf of citizens, who ultimately are the
owners of the resource. However, there will be
differences in how those assets are distributed, as
will be discussed below.Copes and Charles ITQs and Community-Based Fishery Management   175
Given that ITQs are promoted as economically
efficient market mechanisms, it is interesting to
speculate why they have not been introduced using
the ultimate market tool: an auction of quotas. After
all, rather than simply giving away access rights,
the government could use the proceeds of an auc-
tion to pay for fisheries management, or add it to
government general revenue as a return to the people
of the relevant jurisdiction. On closer inspection,
the reason this was not done becomes clear. While
“market-efficient,” an auction would mean that
many established fishers would immediately lose
access to the fishery for want of finances to compete
in the auction, and this would be justifiably unac-
ceptable to the fishing industry. So those promoting
ITQ systems sacrificed the market efficiency they
claimed to seek, and recommended simply giving
away quota rights worth many millions of dollars,
in order to gain approval from currently licensed
vessel owners to accept an ITQ system. Once ITQs
were installed and trades in quota had taken place,
committed promoters were confident an ITQ system
would be almost impossible to reverse. In partic-
ular, new owners of quota, who had paid the full
market price for it, would have to be paid compen-
sation to undo the quota rights, and the expense of
this would likely prove to be prohibitive.
Capacity Reduction and Concentration
Now let us turn to a major implication of ITQ
systems, namely that they lead naturally to concen-
tration of quota among fewer boat owners, as some
(perhaps the more technically efficient, or perhaps
those with larger financial resources) buy quota from
others. This has two major effects, one in terms of
employment and community impacts (discussed
below) and the other in terms of reductions in
fishing capacity (catching power). The latter has
the desirable effect of increasing the total economic
benefits from harvesting—at least in the short
term—as it allows the TAC to be caught with fewer
boats, with lower fishing costs per unit of catch.
However, in an ITQ system, capacity reduction
occurs in an unplanned manner with respect to
socioeconomic impacts. The market decides who
buys out whom in the fishery. In the extreme, with-
out limits on such buying and selling of ITQs, there
would be nothing to prevent the fishery from
becoming permanently controlled by a few large
companies or even a single corporation. This
approach to fishery management has sometimes
been advocated, despite evidence suggesting such
monopolization in the fishery would imply an
undesirable concentration of economic power that
could easily be abused and that is intrinsically
inefficient. On the other hand, if capacity reduc-
tions need to be made in a community-based man-
agement system, this can be done in a deliberate
way, to achieve specified public objectives. For ex-
ample, if the goal is to reduce catching power while
harming employment as little as possible, capacity
reduction might be accomplished through buy-back
of the more capital-intensive vessels.
The capacity reduction that may be facilitated by
an ITQ system is likely to generate financial
benefits, but distribution of those benefits is widely
considered to be inequitable. The first generation of
quota-holders receives a windfall in the form of
“free” ITQ from the government—a mechanism
which, as noted above, seems to have been adopted
to convince current vessel owners to accept ITQ
schemes. Later generations must buy or lease quota
at high prices from the original holders, and indeed
may be unable to afford to get into the fishery at all.
Certainly, servicing the loans needed to buy quota
is likely to leave subsequent generations of fishers
(unless they are lucky enough to inherit their fishing
rights) with incomes no greater, and often lower,
than those existing before an ITQ regime was estab-
lished. Particularly when interest rates rise, quite a
few may face bankruptcy.
Crew Members and Other Fishery
Participants
Since ITQs are typically initiated by giving out
quota to vessel owners, this has meant that crew
members, and indeed all participants in the fishery
other than vessel owners, receive no benefits from
the ITQ system. Thus, if a vessel owner decides to
sell off an ITQ, the crew members of the vessel
receive none of the proceeds of that sale, despite
having been closely involved in creating the catch
history which generated the ITQ in the first place.
This situation indicates crew members are especi-
ally likely to lose out when ITQs are implemented.
Upon implementation of an ITQ system, they may
well find themselves unable to go fishing, with no
compensation. In the longer term, if and when they
aspire to become licensed operators in their own
right, they often find the cost of buying quotas
prohibitive. The option left to them is to lease quota
from corporations, or private investors, often at
very high lease rates. In Iceland, where much of
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80% of the value of the catch are reported. Clearly,
there is a notable inter-generational inequity in-
volved in having initial recipients receive a free gift
of quotas from a public resource, while subsequent
generations have to pay exorbitant purchase or lease
rates.
These evident inequities, common to most ITQ
systems, mean such a market-based arrangement is
unlikely to be chosen under a community-based
management system (except perhaps if, as is
sometimes attempted, the “community” is defined
narrowly as merely those selected by government to
own ITQs!). A more carefully planned community-
based system is likely to operate so as to allow “new
blood” to enter the fishery over time, from within
the community. It is likely that well-qualified and
ambitious crew members would be prime candidates
for community-brokered entry to replace retiring
fishers. A likely device—one being actively devel-
oped in a number of communities—would be the
use of license and/or quota banks, depending on
management arrangements used. The licenses and/
or quotas would be leased under reasonable condi-
tions and at reasonable rates to qualified fishers
within the community.
Flexibility in Fishing
An oft-noted benefit of an annual individual quota
is that it can be caught whenever the fisher desires,
allowing for flexibility in fishing activity (e.g., by
avoiding fishing in bad weather or by harvesting
when prices are high), so that fishing is more pro-
ductive (greater profits per day fishing), compared
to a free-for-all system. However, with community-
based management, the same benefits can be ob-
tained, either through annual quota allowances made
to participating fishers, or with appropriate openings
and closings made by the community management
board, based on monitoring of weather and market
conditions.
Impacts on Communities
As noted above, experience has shown that when-
ever ITQs are implemented, capacity rationalization
takes place in the fishery, with concentration of
quota in fewer hands leading to higher profits for
initial recipients, but reduced employment in the
fishery. Fishing capacity rationalization itself is
neither inherently positive nor negative. It may well
be necessary at times to maintain economic via-
bility and allow fishing communities to share in the
benefits of higher productivity in an advancing
economy. Thus, the socioeconomic concerns relating
to ITQs and capacity rationalization lie not in the
rationalization phenomenon itself, but rather in the
tendency to produce an excessive concentration of
fishery access rights—both financially and geo-
graphically, as described below. This concentration
is liable to inflict damage on smaller fishing
communities, and the welfare of their people, by
alienating their resources, reducing their incomes,
and diminishing their viability.
First, when ITQs are freely tradable, corpora-
tions and large investors in the fisheries sector may
use their financial power to buy up large aggre-
gations of quota, thereby concentrating a substantial
share of fishery access rights in their hands. They
may assign their quota holdings to larger vessels
which they operate directly, or lease out quota (with
or without boats) to independent fishers, or provide
loans to fishers to buy boats and quota—in all cases
usually on condition that the fish caught be deliv-
ered to their plants.
Second, in terms of geography, the high level of
capitalization in fishery access rights resulting from
the ITQ system, and the corresponding financial
concentration of ownership or control by corpora-
tions and investors, is likely to produce a geograph-
ical concentration toward the larger ports where the
quota owners have their main facilities. This will
occur for reasons of operational efficiency and
control, with quota owners tending to concentrate
the fleets they own, or support, close to their pro-
cessing and holding facilities. Diversion of quotas
to larger centers has a cumulative economic effect
in the smaller communities. Since they have fewer
active boats left, boat repair, baiting, and other
related activities are reduced, whereby total fishery-
related employment is diminished to an even greater
extent. Furthermore, a reduction in the economic
multiplier effect from shrinking fishing income in
the local economy means that in addition to fishery-
related job losses, there may be considerable job
losses elsewhere in affected communities. Thus,
despite higher profits for the original group of
vessel owners, the extent of job losses may swiftly
produce an overall negative impact on smaller
communities. Many of those communities, which
otherwise would have remained economically and
socially viable, may eventually lose so much of
their critical economic mass as to face serious
decline or abandonment. This would imply losses in
social infrastructure and in individual wealth of the
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outlays associated with unemployment payments
and re-employment costs.
There may also be serious non-economic losses
for those who would rather have stayed in the
familiar surroundings of their community if it had
remained economically viable. Many of them
would grieve the loss of accustomed social relations
and a familiar and attractive physical environment.
Finally, it should be noted that the reduction in the
number of inhabited places along the coast would
have adverse consequences for the country at large,
for instance, in terms of tourism, by reducing ser-
viced access to parts of the country that would be
attractive to visit. The fundamental point here is
that the economic costs to society of the concen-
tration of fishing operations through ITQs are likely
to be quite significant, and may be substantially
larger than the gains enjoyed by the benefitting
companies and vessel operators. But typically these
costs are not accounted for in decisions to move
toward an ITQ system.
With community-based management, a measure
of capacity rationalization may also be called for,
but this may be done in a planned way to minimize
adverse impacts. It seems unlikely that the concen-
tration of fishery access rights and resulting fishery
benefits—common in ITQ systems—would be con-
sidered acceptable. On the other hand, a community
might focus more on small-boat operations through
a more labor-intensive fishery, one that will retain
a larger share of fishing income for the local work
force, with a lower reliance on imported capital
equipment.
The implications for fishing communities are
that, first, fully-tradable fishing rights are unlikely
to be desirable in a community-based management
system. Second, there is a need for secure and
privileged access for small fishing communities, or
clusters of such communities, to local stocks. Com-
monly this would involve stocks on which the local
fleet had long relied and to which they might claim
a customary right of access. Such access rights may
be formally recognized as TURFs (territorial use
rights in fisheries), assigning to the community
priority rights to harvest in a geographically defined
area. Where widely dispersed stocks were involved,
they might be shared with other communities
fishing the same stocks through the assignment of
community quotas, mediated by higher authority.
To meet the intended purpose, the community quota
normally would be available only to fishing units
based in the community. This recognition of rights
to adjacent resources on which communities have
been historically dependent can be justified on the
grounds of both community economics and conser-
vation. Where economically justified, community
fish plants would have priority access to the locally
based catch.
Indirect Economic Impacts: Conservation
and Fishery Sustainability
ITQ systems and community-based management
differ in their impact on conservation, which in turn
differentially affects the long-term economic bene-
fits these systems can provide. Four key consider-
ations are discussed below: the compatibility of
management with a conservation ethic, the flex-
ibility of fishery management, the tendency to
waste resources, and the efficiency of fishery
enforcement.
(1) Conservation Ethic. An often ignored disad-
vantage of ITQs is that the original hand-out of
quotas, on the basis of “catch history,” rewards boat
owners not for conservationist behavior, but for
aggressive fishing, regardless of stock impacts and
other ecological damage. The larger the catch
history, the larger the quota, which is received free
of charge. This creates an incentive to maximize
one’s catches in any fishery not currently using
individual quotas, so as to create the greatest catch
history, thus threatening conservation. It also sends
a message to fishers that the government places a
higher priority on promoting ITQ systems than it
does on conservation.
It is often claimed by promoters that ITQ holders
are highly motivated to fish sustainably, because
they will want to keep up the value of the ITQs they
own. The claim fails the test of logic for two
reasons. First, it confuses the collective interest of
ITQ holders with their individual interests. Each
individual ITQ holder can benefit from wasting fish
through “high-grading” and other harmful practices
(discussed below), because he/she gets the full fi-
nancial benefit from doing so, while suffering only
a small portion of the resulting loss to the fishery as
a whole, which is spread over all ITQ holders. The
individual profit incentive, which is the driving
force for an ITQ fishery, thus motivates individual
fishing practices contrary to conservation. There is
a second type of anti-conservation incentive that
motivates ITQ holders in certain fisheries, partic-
ularly of long-lived species. This concerns cases
where ITQ holders collectively can make exception-
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large stocks to unsustainably low levels, or maybe
to extinction. In the process, these holders may be
able to write off their investment in quotas and
equipment and still retain handsome net returns.
Some of the exceptionally long-lived orange roughy
stocks of New Zealand appear to have provided an
example for this scenario.
Likewise, under community-based management,
there will also be some incentive for fishing prac-
tices that are contrary to conservation. However,
this will be countered by a more favorable perspec-
tive on sustainability, and thus a sounder base for a
conservation ethic, derived from two important
circumstances. First, since community-based man-
agement typically occurs in the context of small-
boat fisheries, the fishers are relatively more de-
pendent on long-term investment in non-transferable
fishing skills than on large financial investments in
rapidly depreciating equipment which can be liq-
uidated over a relatively short period. This should
encourage a more long-term view among fishers.
Second, management in such cases is based on, and
guided by, the collective interest of the community,
expressed in the decisions of a collective authority.
Inter-generational equity and continuing prosperity
for the community as a whole are major features
which drive a need for long-term sustainable use
and equitable sharing of the community’s fishery
resources—objectives less likely to be advocated by
an ITQ fishery that may well be largely in the hands
of corporations or a small number of privileged
quota holders. Indeed, in smaller communities with
a strong fishery base, it is common to find a
collective interest in the health of the community’s
resource assets, which is strengthened by a col-
lective interest in community-based harvest rights.
This may extend to support for and/or participa-
tion in local fishery resource stewardship under-
takings.
(2) Flexible Management. Flexibility, or adapta-
bility, is important both within the fishing season
and over longer periods of time. Unfortunately, the
proper functioning of ITQ systems requires that
quotas be fixed at the beginning of a season and be
guaranteed for the duration of the season. This
produces an inherent lack of flexibility; it limits the
ability of managers to make in-season adjustments,
lowering the TAC or imposing closures if stock
monitoring indicates catches must be reduced to
avoid damage to the stocks. This proved to be a
significant problem in responding rapidly when cod
stock collapses became apparent in Atlantic Canada
in the early 1990s. With community-based man-
agement, however, flexibility can be built into the
system, for example through a careful form of
limited-entry licensing to regulate the number, size,
and gear of fishing units allowed to operate. Con-
sequently, even though in-season cuts will never be
popular, they can at least be conducted fairly when
needed. This better accounts for high levels of
uncertainty in fish stocks, since stocks can be
monitored throughout the season, allowing fine-
tuning of permitted fishing time in mid-season if
changing stock conditions so demand.
Over longer time periods, ITQ systems are inflex-
ible in another way because, once in place, they can
be expected to be difficult to dismantle. While
governments typically give out quota shares free to
initial quota holders, once the quotas enter into
trade they often assume high values. If, at some
point an ITQ system no longer appears desirable,
due to actual or prospective biological, economic,
or social problems, the government may find it
difficult to move to another management system.
The government may be dissuaded because of the
excessive expense involved in buying out quota
holders, who have been made to feel they “own”
the fish stock, particularly if they have bought
quotas at high prices. Thus, unsatisfactory ITQ
systems may linger on, perhaps leading to stock
collapse. This is important to keep in mind given
that the massive collapse of groundfish stocks in
Atlantic Canada occurred after some 10 years of
experience with the government’s individual quota
management for a large part of the fishery. Both the
near-irreversibility of ITQ systems and their inflex-
ibility in annual quota setting are clearly at odds
with the requirements of the FAO-mandated and
internationally accepted precautionary approach in
fisheries management.
International and national fishery concerns
have recently turned to the need to pursue
ecosystem-based management, considering all
of the interactions among stocks of different
species and their competing uses of the marine
food web. Ecosystem-based management is not
well served by the single-species management
practice which lies at the foundation of ITQ
systems. On the other hand, community-based
management has the potential to better take into
account ecosystem realities—and indeed it can
be argued that community-based management
and ecosystem-based management are closely con-
nected through their emphasis on a “place-based”
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(3) Avoiding Waste. A key objective of commun-
ity-based fishery management is to get the greatest
possible benefits for fishers and communities from
the available harvest. Clearly, waste through dis-
carding of marketable fish is not compatible with
this objective, so the specific management measures
adopted will aim to minimize such waste. In con-
trast, ITQ fisheries are notorious for their inherent
incentives and/or management requirements that
lead to the discarding of marketable fish. One
illustration of this is high-grading, in which a quota
holder maximizes revenue by keeping only fish of
the highest value per pound (“keep the $3/kg fish
and dump the $1/kg fish”). This may result (and by
experience has already resulted) in large quantities
of discarded fish, and thus a drain on the stock,
leading to lower TACs in future years.
A second problem arises when ITQ fishers
encounter in their catch non-target fish of a species
for which they do not have the requisite quota.
While in theory, fishers might sometimes be able to
deal with this by buying enough quota of that
species, there is a strong incentive for dumping the
fish at sea, rather than paying a high quota price for
what may be, for example, low-valued juvenile fish.
In any case, ITQ systems experience great difficulty
in administering mixed-stock fisheries, because the
pre-season amounts of quota distributed for differ-
ent species rarely match the proportions in which
various species happen to be caught during the
forthcoming year. This may result in discards of
species caught in excess of quota, or closing of
a mixed-stock fishery to protect stocks for which
the full quota has been taken, even though it means
foregoing uncaught amounts of other species in the
mix for which quotas have not yet been filled.
(4) Efficient Enforcement. To the extent that ITQ
schemes lead to a fewer number of fishers, in fewer
communities, this may seem to make the tra-
ditional top-down enforcement easier—after all,
fewer fishers should be easier to monitor. Yet, in
real-world settings, enforcement of individual quotas
can be a severe problem, particularly in small-boat
fisheries with large numbers of vessels and plenty
of opportunities to sell fish unobserved over the
side or through colluding fish companies. The
illegal catch over and above the TAC (“quota
busting”) means overfishing and a threat to sustain-
ability of the fishery. This is a recognized problem
with ITQs, and often the proposed solution is to
restrict fishers to just a few larger landing sites,
and/or to have observers on board. Such require-
ments may be very expensive to implement, even to
the point of being financially prohibitive, while
their effectiveness is much in question. Compulsory
landing sites do not prevent the transfer of illegal
catches or the discarding of cheaper fish (“high-
grading”) at sea, while observer programs are
typically unable to ensure the monitoring of all
landings—for example, a single observer on a vessel
clearly cannot remain on duty 24 hours a day.
Community-based management is likely to make
less use of individual quota systems, if using them
at all, so the wasteful discarding practices of ITQ
systems may not be an issue. Even if individual
quotas were to be used in community management,
the potential problems that could arise may be
avoided thanks to a community-wide attitude of re-
source stewardship. A sense of collective solidarity
in managing a local resource for local advantage
may help greatly in securing compliance with regu-
lations, through peer pressure among fishers and
the willingness to report and discipline offenders
who violate the rules of common interest. Thus com-
munity quotas in conjunction with co-management
and local stewardship may help to avoid or lessen
anti-conservationist behavior such as quota busting
and high-grading.
In such a situation, it may even be possible for a
community to work with a locally administered
system of individual non-transferable quotas, if
there is a sensitive allocation of these to current and
succeeding generations. From an enforcement
perspective, even an ITQ system—if confined to a
small, tightly knit group of fishers—may be able,
through peer observation and peer pressure, to
produce reasonable compliance with regulations.
However, the inequities commonly attached to ITQ
systems are less likely to mesh with community
solidarity and stewardship. In any case, since
community-based management allows for a wider
variety of management tools than just individual
quotas, a suitable “package” can be chosen to mini-
mize economic incentives for illegal behavior.
Concluding Comments
In the concluding comments below, we highlight
several key points to keep in mind with respect to
the debate between community-based management
(CBM) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs):
P Obviously, fisheries are not all the same. In some
fisheries, perhaps those of a more corporate nature,
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connection to particular coastal communities, ITQs
may give reasonable economic benefits while posing
relatively few problems to conservation and to soci-
ety. Indeed, such fisheries may not be at all suited to
community-based approaches. On the other hand, in
cases like coastal small-boat fisheries, ITQs likely
have the greatest costs and the fewest benefits, while
community-based management may well be a much
more suitable choice. The important point is to reject
the idea that “one size fits all.” This point is all the
more important to keep in mind given that one
option—ITQs—has received high levels of study
and promotion, while other options, notably com-
munity-based management, have received far too
little attention.
P If participants in a small-boat fishery were push-
ing for individual quota management, the option of
individual non-transferable quotas should be
considered. As with ITQs, such systems are often
prone to conservation problems, like high-grading
and dumping, but the problems of such practices
might be manageable in some fisheries because of
their particular circumstances. There still would be
questions of social equity to consider, but these
could be reduced with non-transferability. Reduc-
tions in fleet capacity, where required, would take
place not through arbitrary buying and selling of
quota, and concentration of ownership, but rather
through voluntary buy-back programs. With a fleet
reduced to the appropriate size, retiring fishers
would be replaced by qualified and experienced
crew members, willing and able to buy a boat.
Some concessions to facilitate family successions
might be considered. The tricky part may be in
maintaining non-transferability. Since this approach
removes the large windfall gains to initial holders
that ITQs give, pressure may develop among
windfall-seeking fishers to convert non-transferable
quotas into ITQs. If this is allowed to happen,
which has occurred already in many fisheries that
started with non-transferable quotas, the negative
social impacts of ITQs end up appearing after all,
and principles of inter-generational equity would be
violated. The best safeguards against such socially
adverse developments would lie in a new, more sen-
sitive government policy disallowing such develop-
ments, or at least requiring community approval of
ITQs, whereby the decision would not be left to a
small group of self-interested windfall seekers who
happened to be the current license holders.
P To make proper choices among management
approaches, it is crucial to take a broad view of the
impacts of fishery management systems. It is
important to look not only at how management
choices affect boat owners, but also to examine
economic impacts on crew members, on related
industries such as baiting and boat repair, on
communities, on the coastal economy as a whole,
and of course on the success of conservation
measures, which in turn affect the long-term
economics of the fishery. This suggests the need
for research that integrates fishery economics
with regional economics, to deal better with the
“big picture” of how activity in one sector, like
the fishery, affects other economic sectors, and
indeed an entire region, such as a stretch of the
coastline.
P Taking into account the “big picture” econom-
ically implies a change in how fishery policy is
developed. Up to now, it was usually developed
and implemented without an understanding of the
connections between the fishery and other eco-
nomic activity along the coastline—in isolation
from coastal communities, the coastal economy,
and indeed the rest of the world. In the future,
fishery policy and management must take into
account a full range of socioeconomic consider-
ations, including not only income and profits, but
also aspects of intra- and inter-generational equity
and quality of life. There must also be a
coordination with coastal zone management and
community-based economic diversification to
create appropriate employment alternatives. With
this broader perspective, all the objectives of soci-
ety should be taken into account in fishery decision
making.
P In the course of historical development, some
measure of population migration inevitably be-
comes necessary in response to major changes
(e.g., in resource availability, productivity, trade
relations, and demographics). Yet this is no excuse
for forcing an unnecessary degree of financial
and geographical concentration of fishing activ-
ities through the imposition of ITQ management
systems that are demonstrably insensitive to
social needs, highly inequitable in their distribu-
tional consequences, and in many ways harmful
to conservation. Community-based fishery man-
agement provides an alternative with the potential
to avoid these negatives. It deserves greater
attention as an option in fishery management and
a vehicle to support fishing people and coastal
communities.Copes and Charles ITQs and Community-Based Fishery Management   181
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